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Proving Public Interest:  
The Growing Impact of Evidence in Free Movement Case Law 
 
Niamh Nic Shuibhne and Marsela Maci * 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
When national measures restrict the free movement rights conferred by EU law, 
Member States have the opportunity to argue that their actions are, nevertheless, 
justifiable and proportionate. But how do they actually demonstrate this? This article 
explores the standard that States must satisfy to prove their public interest claims 
successfully. It will be argued that a critical information gap on what the Court of 
Justice expects defendant States to establish has been narrowed through a more 
concerted focus on proof in recent case law; but that significant issues still demand 
further attention. The incomplete articulation or inconsistent application of evidence 
standards can generate a suspicion of instrumental application, a risk compounded 
by the fact that, as an element of procedural law, a State’s approach to standard of 
proof issues is profoundly shaped by national practices: and therefore by national 
differences.1 The way in which Member State arguments are scrutinised thus raises 
sharp rule of law concerns, one of the Union’s foundational values according to 
Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), if a clear and systematic approach 
to the required standard of proof is lacking. The impact of procedural gaps on the 
substantive development of free movement law is another concern here: this has 
been touched upon in commentary on the European Court of Human Rights,2 but 
has not yet been addressed comprehensively for the justification and proportionality 
framework applied by the Court of Justice. 
 The argument developed in the article has three linked aspects. First, at the 
level of procedural law, there has been a basic absence of detailed guidance on the 
                                                     
* Chair of EU Law and Post-Doctoral Fellow in EU Law, University of Edinburgh. This 
project was generously supported by the Law School’s Strategic Investment Fund and by the 
College of Humanities and Social Sciences, through the establishment of a post-doctoral 
research fellowship from September 2011 to February 2013. We are also very grateful to 
Alexander Kornezov, Jonathan Tompkin, and the editors of the Review for their insightful 
comments on an earlier draft. 
1 E.g. on common law and civil law procedures for expert evidence and fact-finding, see DAO 
Edward, ‘Evidence, proof, fact-finding and the expert witness’, 7th Sir Michael Davies 
Lecture 2004, Expert Witness Institute, available at http://www.law.du.edu/documents/judge-
david-edward-oral-history/2004-proof-fact-finding.pdf. Although addressing the distinct 
field of evidence in criminal matters, see also the general discussion on different national 
approaches to proof by the European Commission in its Proposal for a Council Framework 
Decision on the European Evidence Warrant for obtaining objects, documents and data for 
use in proceedings in criminal matters, COM(2003) 688 final.  
2 U Erdal, ‘Burden and standard of proof in proceedings under the European Convention’ 
(2001) 26 Supp (Human rights survey 2001) 68. On evidence rules in the ECHR context, see K 
Reid, A practitioner’s Guide to the European Convention on Human Rights, 4th edn. (Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2012). 
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applicable standard of proof in free movement law. A framework can be pieced 
together by extracting key principles from relevant – and especially more recent – 
case law, but it is questionable whether this is sufficient to assist national judges and 
national lawyers with understanding how the Court of Justice works, especially since 
most practitioners will only very rarely encounter a dispute with an EU free 
movement angle. Second, it is difficult to establish the role that evidence should play 
in the justification and proportionality stages of free movement analysis. There are 
complex considerations and sensitivities involved in making these kinds of 
determinations, raising fundamental questions about whether public interest can be 
neatly ‘proven’ anyway; and whether courts should – whether for reasons of 
expertise or deference to more democratic interest-determining processes – make 
these kinds of decisions at all. However, third, it is clear that much more attention 
has been placed on proof and evidence in recent case law. This in turn raises 
questions about the value of applying a language of empiricism to public interest 
claims; and whether there are implicit case law patterns suggesting a latent hierarchy 
of public interest values, or of different kinds of restrictions, or both.  
 In Section 2, we first establish why more sustained reflection on evidence and 
proof actually matters, noting the limited extent to which these questions have been 
pulled together for free movement law to date. Following a brief exposition of the 
justification and proportionality framework applied by the Court (Section 3), we then 
outline the sparse standard of proof directions that appear in official documentary 
guidance such as the Court’s Rules of Procedure (Section 4) and the more detailed 
framework that can be constructed from free movement case law (Section 5). We 
demonstrate that there has been a distinct shift from negative to positive guidance in 
recent years. However, as a case study, we then discuss the difficulty of unpicking 
economic arguments from public interest claims to illustrate a series of remaining 
proof problems (Section 6). We suggest, overall, that knowing an appropriate 
standard of proof has to be reached is one thing; but knowing what it is and how to 
reach it is something else entirely.  
 
2. Why does proof matter? 
 
Most discourse on evidence and proof in EU law concentrates on competition law.3 
More generally, discussion of evidence issues tends to be confined to either a specific 
type of evidence (especially expert4 and scientific5 evidence) or a specialised subject 
                                                     
3 E.g. M Joao Melicias, ‘”Did they do it?” The interplay between the standard of  proof and the 
presumption of innocence in EU cartel investigations’ (2012) 35:3 W. Comp. 471; C-D 
Ehlermann and M Marquis (eds), European Competition Law Annual 2009 The evaluation of 
evidence and its judicial review in competition cases (Hart Publishing, 2011); D Bailey, 
‘Presumptions in EU competition law’ (2010) 31:9 ECLR 362; E Gippini-Fournier ‘The elusive 
standard of  proof in EU competition cases’ (2010) 33:2 W. Comp. 187; K Lenaerts ‘Some 
thoughts on evidence and procedure in European Community competition law’ (2006) 30:5 
Fordham Int’l LJ 1463; A Pera and V Auricchio, ‘Consumer welfare, standard of proof and the 
objectives of competition policy’ (2005) 1:1 Euro CJ 153. 
4 E.g. EB de la Serre and A Sibony, ‘Expert evidence before the EC Courts’ (2008) 45:4 
CMLRev 941; J MacLennan ‘Evidence, standard and burden of proof and the use of experts in 
procedure before the Luxembourg Courts’ in F Weiss (ed.), Improving WTO Dispute Settlement 
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area (especially environmental law, 6  and discrimination and equality issues 7 ). 
Additionally, analysis of evidence and proof questions normally focuses on the scope 
of judicial review vis-à-vis the breadth of the discretion enjoyed by the EU legislator,8 
or on the development of detailed frameworks of guidance for national courts 
constructed over time through composite case law building blocks (e.g. the Court’s 
profile of the ‘average consumer’9). Notwithstanding the specific contexts in which 
that work considers questions of proof, however, the general themes that emerge 
below for free movement law can also be seen here. For example, in their discussion 
of expert evidence, de la Serre and Sibony highlight the striking scarcity of rules on 
the admissibility of evidence in EU law.10 They also show that the Court of Justice is 
influenced primarily by what the parties involved in the dispute submit: it does not 
tend to introduce new arguments or dimensions even though, as will be seen in 
Section 4, its Statute provides the Court with the necessary inquisitorial powers 
should it decide to seek evidence on its own initiative.  
 More specifically for free movement law, general currents in the literature 
argue against a shift towards more competition-like analysis of complex economic 
evidence. But these debates are normally about the scope of restrictions on free 
movement rights – addressing, for example, the inaptness of a de minimis threshold 
for evidence-connected reasons. 11  Work that focuses on justification and 
proportionality more distinctly deals primarily with questions connected to burden of 
                                                                                                                                                        
Procedures: Issues and Lessons from the Practice of other International Courts and Tribunals 
(Cameron May, 2000) 265.  
5 For an example of how the Court engages with scientific evidence to establish the veracity of 
a justification claim in free movement law, see e.g. Case C-67/97 Criminal proceedings against 
Bluhme [1998] ECR I-8033, paras 33-38. 
6 E.g. J McEldowney and S McEldowney, ‘Science and environmental law: collaboration 
across the double helix’ (2011) 13:3 EnvLRev 169; A Biondi, M Cecchetti, S Grassi and M Lee 
(eds) Scientific Evidence in European Environmental Rule-Making: The Case of the Landfill and of 
End-of-Life Vehicles Directives (Kluwer, 2003). 
7  E.g. B Havelkova, ‘Burden of proof and positive action in the Czech and Slovak 
constitutional courts: Milestones or millstones in implementing EC  equality law?’ (2007) 32:5 
ELRev 686; G Beck, ‘The state of EC anti-sex discrimination law and the judgment in Cadman, 
or how the legal can become the political’ (2007) 32:4 ELRev 549; M Barbera, ‘Not the same? 
The judicial role in the new Community anti-discrimination law context’ (2002) 31:1 ILJ 82. 
8 E.g. Case C-425/08 Enviro Tech (Europe) Ltd v Belgian State [2009] ECR I-10035, esp. paras 47 
and 62. Again, this issue is more developed in the field of competition law; see e.g. Case C-
525/04 P Spain v Lenzing [2007] ECR I-9947, para. 57 (with extensive case law citations). 
9 E.g. Case C-446/07 Severi v Regione Emilia-Romagna [2009] ECR I-8041, paras 61-62; Case C-
356/04 Lidl Belgium GmbH & Co. KG v Etablissementen Franz Colruyt NV [2006] ECR I-8501, 
paras 77-84. 
10 De la Serre and Sibony, n4 above, 958. 
11 For an overview of the approach of the Court to these kinds of threshold questions, see AG 
Bot in Case C-110/05 Commission v Italy (Trailers) [2009] ECR I-519, from para. 116 of the 
Opinion; and see generally, G Davies, ‘The Court’s jurisprudence on free movement of goods: 
Pragmatic presumptions, not philosophical principles’ (2012) European Journal of Consumer 
Law 25. 
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proof.12 There are examples of more extended analyses of standard of proof issues in 
sectoral legal development reviews in particular.13 But there is limited discussion of 
standard of proof in a more cross-cutting sense, or of how the management of 
evidence and proof traverses procedural law and manifests as part of the material 
development of free movement law too.  
 Rules on evidence and proof are, at their core, a matter of procedural law.  As 
a preliminary objective, this article thus seeks to elucidate the applicable rules, 
drawn from relevant official documents and guidance scattered across the case law. 
But we also explore how that limited baseline of procedural guidance traverses more 
substantive questions of EU law. First, there is a basic but fundamental rule of law 
question. It will be shown in Section 5 that the adequacy of the evidence submitted 
has become an increasingly critical factor in the assessment and determination of 
State public interest arguments. But can it be said, in turn, that the relevant standard 
of proof is sufficiently clear, properly articulated, and coherently applied? Second, 
we have to recall the role of the Court as a steering judicial institution with respect to 
both the Member States generally and national courts more specifically. Approaches 
to evidence differ across national legal traditions, and will thus necessarily shape 
both how States (and lawyers) frame their public interest arguments and how 
national courts respond to them. The inevitability of this local rootedness reinforces 
the need for systematic guidance at the central level, yet this seems to be an 
overlooked dimension of the Court’s conventional emphasis on the uniformity of EU 
law and associated remedies.  
 Third, questions of proof bring an additional layer to a crucial constitutional 
question: whether the line between free movement rights and national policy 
concerns is correctly drawn – especially since States can successfully evidence public 
interest arguments, but mostly do not. This point is attenuated by a perception 
among scholars that the balance between internal market uniformity and local 
regulatory diversity is improperly calibrated at present. National policy choices are 
often diverse; and they are often entrenched at constitutional level in national legal 
orders. They can also reflect conscious expressions of national or more local identity, 
which the EU is required to respect in accordance with Article 4(2) TEU. Free 
movement rights, on the other hand, are depicted as the beating heart of the 
integration project, pitching the internal market as the antithesis of the kind of 
national protectionism that has no place in a frontier-free transnational polity. In free 
movement case law, a balance must somehow be struck to deliver both the proper 
functioning of the market and due recognition and protection of national autonomy. 
                                                     
12 E.g. C Kilpatrick, ‘The Court of Justice and labour law in 2010: A new EU discrimination 
law architecture’ (2011) 40:3 ILJ 280; G Mathisen, ‘Consistency and coherence as conditions 
for justification of Member State measures restricting free movement’ (2010) 47:4 CMLRev 
1021; C Barnard, ‘Restricting restrictions: Lessons for the EU from the US?’ (2009) 68:3 CLJ 
575; C Barnard, ‘Derogations, justifications and the four freedoms: Is State interest really 
protected?’ in C Barnard and O Odudu (eds.), The Outer Limits of European Union Law (Hart 
Publishing, 2009) 273. 
13 E.g. on the free movement of services, see V Hatzopoulos, ‘The Court’s approach to services 
(2006-2012): From case law to case load?’ (2013) 50:2 CMLRev 459; and S Enchelmaier, 
‘Always at your service (within limits): The ECJ’s case law on Article 56 TFEU (2006/11)’ 
(2011) 36:5 ELRev 615.  
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In a general sense, ‘the EU courts have been criticised for following a pro-integration 
agenda and augmenting the competences of the [Union] at the expense of national 
sovereignty’. 14 More specifically, on the intersection of internal market law and 
fundamental rights, Weatherill writes that ‘[t]he Court’s practice makes plain that a 
wider scope for EU free movement law means a correspondingly wider scope for 
affording individuals the protection of fundamental rights recognised by the EU 
legal order. It widens the scope of its own adjudicative function too. But it also 
means a correspondingly narrower scope for national rule-making…In this sense a 
connection may usefully be made with discussion...about the legitimate limits of EU 
law’s review of national regulatory choices’.15 
 Finally, the analysis that follows concedes the sheer complexity of public 
interest arguments, in the sense that they represent political, economic, social and 
ethical choices that must somehow be pushed through the filter of law and legal 
adjudication. Moreover, when the Court of Justice reviews State public interest 
arguments, it engages with a range of very different things, from methodological or 
technical questions – e.g. evaluating the rationality or consistency of national policy 
measures – to more obviously substantive questions e.g. the reasonableness or 
effectiveness of those measure(s). Reflections on evidence and proof thus raise 
critical questions about the qualities that legal decision-making attributes, or strives to 
attribute, to a framework constructed through empiricism – primarily, questions 
about relative objectivity and subjectivity; but also about expertise and functional 
disciplinary boundaries, as well as how and why we might generate (or fail to 
generate) a wider culture as well as language of proof. Ultimately, in other words, 
the article questions whether enhancing the relevance of proof in the sphere of public 
interest claims is a straightforwardly positive step. 
 
3. Justification and proportionality: The basic framework  
 
Article 4(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) confirms 
that the internal market is an area where competence is shared between the Union 
and the Member States. The fact that States can legitimately restrict free movement 
rights in certain circumstances is one expression of that regulatory balance. In some 
respects, questions about justification and proportionality are the poor relation of the 
logically prior issue: whether a national rule or practice constitutes a restriction of 
free movement rights in the first place. The restriction question is, of course, the 
critical gateway: if a national measure is not considered to fall within the scope of the 
Treaty, any discussion of justification and proportionality is irrelevant.  
And yet, justification and proportionality mark the point at which most free 
movement cases are won or lost, because the definition of a restriction on free 
movement rights is extremely broad. For example, in CaixaBank, the Court defined 
restrictions on freedom of establishment as ‘[a]ll measures which prohibit, impede or 
                                                     
14 T Tridmias and G Gari, ‘Winners and losers in Luxembourg: A statistical analysis of judicial 
review before the European Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance: 2001-2005’ (2010) 
35:2 ELRev 131 at 135. 
15 S Weatherill, Cases and Materials on EU Law, 10th ed. (OUP, 2012), 415-416 (emphasis in 
original). 
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render less attractive the exercise of that freedom’.16 Similar language has been used 
across free movement law.17 Discrimination (in law or effect) is not a necessary 
condition e.g. the Court has also held that Article 45 TFEU catches ‘national rules 
which are applicable irrespective of the nationality of the workers concerned but 
impede their freedom of movement’.18 Additionally, as noted above, there is no de 
minimis threshold.19 It is not difficult to argue, therefore, that a national measure 
either does or might restrict free movement rights within the meaning of the Treaty – 
triggering consequential consideration of justification and proportionality in 
virtually all free movement disputes.  
For national measures that are either indirectly discriminatory (i.e. 
discriminatory in effect) or non-discriminatory, Member States can submit 
justification arguments on any public interest grounds that they consider to be 
relevant.20 The Court has confirmed that such measures may be justified ‘in order to 
meet imperative requirements’ 21 or by ‘overriding reasons in the public interest 
capable of justifying restrictions on the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the 
Treaty’.22 At one level, the flexibility extended to Member States through the two-
stream justification framework is extraordinary, since it enables them to raise the 
most singular, local, or esoteric public interest concerns that might possibly be 
relevant. However, even if a national measure is considered to be justifiable in 
principle, a proportionality test then becomes critical since ‘a restriction on the 
fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Treaty may be justified only if the relevant 
measure is appropriate to ensuring the attainment of the objective in question and 
does not go beyond what is necessary to attain that objective’.23 The appropriateness 
of a national measure is often presented as an appraisal of its suitability. Assessment 
of its necessity normally involves consideration of whether alternative measures that 
can achieve the stated public interest objective but have less restrictive effects on intra-
EU trade can be conceived, as discussed further in Section 5(d). 
 Two general framing points should be noted at this stage. First, the function 
of the Court of Justice is necessarily different in direct actions and indirect actions. To 
establish an infringement in a direct action against a Member State for failure to fulfil 
                                                     
16 Case C-442/02 CaixaBank France v Ministère de l'Économie, des Finances et de l'Industrie [2004] 
ECR I-8961, para. 11. 
17 E,g. for services, see Case C-76/90 Säger v Dennemeyer & Co. Ltd [1991] ECR I-4221, para. 12. 
18 Case C-464/02 Commission v Denmark [2005] ECR I-7929, para. 45. The absence of 
discrimination in law or in effect is fatal only for (1) restrictions on the export of goods under 
Article 35 TFEU (Case 15/79 P.B. Groenveld BV v Produktschap voor Vee en Vlees [1979] ECR 
3409) and (2) selling arrangements for Article 34 TFEU (Joined Cases C-267/91 and C268/91 
Criminal Proceedings against Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR I-6097). 
19 E.g. Case C-126/91 Schutzverband gegen Unwesen in der Wirtschaft e.V. v Yves Rocher GmbH 
[1993] ECR 1-2361, para. 21. 
20 This open-ended justification route was first substantively developed as the doctrine of 
‘mandatory requirements’ for Article 34 TFEU (Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentrale AG v 
Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon) [1979] ECR 649, para. 8). 
21 Commission v Italy (Trailers), para. 59. 
22 Case C-384/08 Attanasio Group Srl v Comune di Carbognano [2010] ECR I-2055, para. 50. 
23 Attanasio Group, para. 51 (emphasis added). 
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an obligation under EU free movement law (Article 258 TFEU),24 the burden of proof 
falls on the Commission i.e. the Commission must prove that the contested national 
measure (or the lack of a national measure) restricts free movement rights.25 At a 
basic level, the Court outlines the required standard of proof as follows: ‘[i]t is the 
Commission’s responsibility to place before the Court all the factual information needed 
to enable the Court to establish that the obligation has not been fulfilled and, in so 
doing, the Commission may not rely on any presumption’. 26 If a restriction of free 
movement rights is established, the burden of proof for its justification passes to the 
Member State.27 This shift is entirely understandable, since national measures that 
restrict or potentially restrict free movement are justifiable only as exceptions to the 
rights conferred by EU law. The Court distinguishes the arguments that the 
Commission can raise to establish the infringement – which are fixed by the scope of 
the pre-litigation letter of formal notice and reasoned opinion28 – and the wider range 
of arguments that a Member State can submit in its defence: ‘once the subject-matter 
has been defined, the Member State has the right to raise all the pleas available to it in 
order to defend itself. [T]here is no rule of procedure which requires the Member State 
concerned to put forward, during the pre-litigation procedure, all the arguments in 
its defence’.29 
In direct actions, the Court must obviously decide all aspects of the case, 
including the veracity of relevant justification and proportionality arguments. But for 
preliminary rulings, ‘[i]t is one of the essential characteristics of the system of judicial 
cooperation established under Article [267 TFEU] that the Court replies in rather 
abstract and general terms to a question on the interpretation of [EU] law referred to 
it, while it is for the referring court to give a ruling in the dispute before it, taking 
                                                     
24 For a more general overview of infringement proceedings i.e. beyond the specifics of free 
movement law, see L Prete and B Smulders, ‘The coming of age of infringement proceedings’ 
(2010) 47:1 CMLRev 9 
25 Case 96/81 Commission v Netherlands [1982] ECR 1791, para. 6; Case C-159/94 Commission v 
France [1997] ECR I-5815, para. 102; Case C-263/99 Commission v Italy [2001] ECR I-4195, para. 
27; Case C-512/08 Commission v France [2010] ECR I-8833, para. 56. The burden of proof can be 
adjusted by the EU legislator e.g. Regulation 764/2008 laying down procedures relating to the 
application of certain national technical rules to products lawfully marketed in another 
Member State, 2008 OJ L218/21; outwith free movement law, see e.g. Council Directive 
97/80/EC on the burden of proof in cases of discrimination based on sex, 1998 OJ L14/6. 
26 Case C-400/08 Commission v Spain (Shopping centres) [2011] ECR I-1915, para. 58 (emphasis 
added. 
27 If the Commission produces ‘sufficient evidence’ to establish a restriction, ‘it [is] incumbent 
on [the Member State] to contest substantively and in detail the information produced and 
the consequences thereof’ (Case 272/86 Commission v Greece [1988] ECR 4875, para. 21). 
28 Case C-191/95 Commission v Germany [1998] ECR I-5449, para. 55; Case C-266/94 Commission 
v Spain [1995] ECR I-1975, paras 16-18. See also Case C-159/94 Commission v France [1997] ECR 
I-5815, paras 101-106. 
29 Case C-414/97 Commission v Spain [1999] ECR I-5585, para. 19 (emphasis added); however, 
pleas raised for the first time in the rejoinder will not be admissible because they are ‘not 
based on matters of law or of fact which came to light in the course of the procedure’ (Case C-
519/03 Commission v Luxembourg [2005] ECR I-3067, para. 22). 
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into account the Court’s reply’.30 In broad terms, this means that the Court of Justice 
determines the questions of law, but the referring court retains authority over 
questions of fact. In his Opinion in Aparape and Tijani, AG Bot argued that the Court 
should not answer questions ‘which would require it to depart from the area of law 
and venture into the area of fact, which is a matter for the national court, whose 
freedom in assessing the evidence laid before it cannot and must not be restricted by the 
definition of precise criteria’.31 In reality, however, the extent of the Court’s review 
tends to vary between being more appropriately hands-off, with reference to the 
division of functions just outlined, and less appropriately prescriptive i.e. where the 
Court exceeds the baseline of providing guidance on questions of law and effectively 
decides the case – including questions of fact – itself.32  
On one view, more definitive rulings provide a ‘useful answer’33 and are 
likely to appeal to national courts for that reason; they may even be guided by the 
content and/or degree of information on relevant evidence that has been included in 
the case file. But not even the acknowledged virtues of procedural economy can 
displace the fact that the constitutional boundaries written into Article 267 are 
overridden. Nor do these kinds of responses help to ensure that national courts 
assume the analysis of cases through an EU legal prism themselves – helping to 
embed EU law more successfully in national legal orders than seems to have 
happened to date. 34  For present purposes, the important point is that the vast 
majority of free movement cases are preliminary rulings; 35  it would thus be a 
significant methodological oversight to focus on questions of evidence and proof in 
direct actions only.  
Second, in a study analysing the Court’s judgments in 1984, 1994, and 2004, 
Barnard established that the case law ‘show[s] a remarkable shift by the Court from 
considerable deference to Member States’ regulatory freedom in 1984…to a greater 
willingness to review Member State justifications in 1994…[to] a more substantial 
                                                     
30 Case C-162/06 International Mail Spain SL v Administración del Estado and Correos [2007] ECR 
I-9911, para. 24.  
31 AG Bot in Case C-529/11 Alarape and Tijani v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
judgment of 8 May 2013, para. 35 of the Opinion (emphasis added). See similarly, Case C-
14/09 Genc v Land Berlin [2010] ECR I-931, para. 32: ‘[t]he national court alone has direct 
knowledge of the facts giving rise to the dispute and is, consequently, best placed to make the 
necessary determinations’. 
32 Even where the role of the national court is expressly acknowledged, the Court can still 
enter into very detailed discussion of the specifics of proportionality in particular; see e.g. 
Joined Cases C-570/07 and C-571/07 Blanco Pérez and Chao Gómez [2010] ECR I4629.  
33 E.g. Case C-142/05 Åklagaren v Mickelsson and Roos [2009] ECR I-4273, para. 41. 
34 See further, H van Harten ‘Proportionality in decentralized action: The Dutch court 
experience in free movement of services and freedom of establishment cases’ (2008) 35 LIEI 
217; and J Baquero Cruz, ‘Francovich and imperfect law’ in M Poiares Maduro and L Azoulai 
(eds.) The Past and Future of EU Law: The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of 
the Rome Treaty (Hart Publishing, 2010) 418. 
35 For example, in the Court’s 2011 Annual Report (available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2012-
06/ra2011_statistiques_cour_en.pdf), 76% of the cases classified as free movement 
proceedings were preliminary rulings (see p97 of the Report for the case law table). 
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review of the Member States’ justifications in 2004, albeit combined with a 
recognition of a greater of number of justifications’.36 Case law patterns are best 
evaluated on the longitudinal view applied in Barnard’s study. It is unlikely, for 
example, that signs of a softening on justification and proportionality in case law on 
rules regulating the use of goods – in which the Court considered that the contested 
rules were justified and proportionate, against the views of two Advocates General37 
– will settle more extensively for either Article 34 specifically or free movement law 
generally. That particular issue is picked up again in Section 5, but the trajectory 
observed by Barnard seems the more deeply rooted trend. Critically, she also 
concluded that ‘where there is a genuine justification at stake, which the host state is 
able to prove and show that the steps taken actually meet the objective, the Court will accept 
the derogation/justification…More usually, however, the Court demonstrates its 
suspicions of the justifications invoked’. 38 This finding underscores the growing 
significance of evidence and proof in free movement law. But has that significance 
been properly reflected and/or rationalised in the shaping of case law practice? 
 
4. Evidence and proof in EU procedural rules 
 
Lenaerts, Arts and Maselis describe fact-finding as ‘the outcome of a complex 
interplay between the parties and between the parties and the Court’.39 But they also 
point out that ‘[EU] law does not lay down any specific rules on the use of evidence. 
All means of proof are admissible except for evidence obtained improperly and internal 
documents, such as an opinion of the legal service of an institution’.40 That statement 
represents the Grundnorm of evidence for EU law. Anderson and Demetriou express 
it with a more critical edge: ‘[t]here are no rules of admissibility, and no effective 
method of putting such evidence to the test: the parties and interveners may put in 
whatever evidence they please, and the Court will give it such weight as it thinks 
appropriate’.41 Where EU rights are being claimed in a national court, the Court has 
stated that ‘given that there is no legislation at [Union] level governing the concept of 
proof, any type of evidence admissible under the procedural law of the Member 
States in similar proceedings is in principle admissible’.42 Starting from that basis, 
how can States distil a better understanding of the applicable standard of proof? 
Article 24 of the Statute of the Court of Justice provides that the Court ‘may 
require the parties to produce all documents and to supply all information which the 
Court considers desirable. Formal note shall be taken of any refusal. The Court may 
also require the Member States and institutions, bodies, offices and agencies not 
                                                     
36 Barnard, n12 above (Outer Limits) 295.  
37 Cf. the decision in Commission v Italy (Trailers) with the Opinions of AG Léger and AG Bot.  
38 Barnard, n12 above (Outer Limits) 293 (emphasis added). 
39 K Lenaerts, D Arts and I Maselis, Procedural Law of the European Union, 2nd edn (Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2006) 556. 
40 Ibid 558 (emphasis added); on the latter point, see Case C-445/00 Commission v Austria 
(Order of 23 October 2002) [2002] ECR I-9151, para. 12. 
41 D Anderson and M Demetriou, References to the European Court, 2nd edn, (Sweet & Maxwell, 
2002) 298 (emphasis added). 
42 Joined Cases C-310/98 and C-406/98 Hauptzollamt Neubrandenburg v Leszek Labis and Sagpol 
SC Transport Miedzynarodowy i Spedycja [2000] ECR I-1797, para. 29. 
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being parties to the case to supply all information which the Court considers 
necessary for the proceedings’. Beyond that general statement, more detailed 
guidance on evidence applies to direct actions only. Article 64 of the Rules of 
Procedure43 establishes that the Court may initiate ‘measures of inquiry’ including, 
according to Article 64(2), requests for information and the production of documents; 
oral testimony; the commissioning of an expert’s report; or an inspection of the place 
or thing in question. Article 64(3) provides that ‘[e]vidence may be submitted in 
rebuttal and previous evidence may be amplified’. There are no statistics on the use 
of measures of inquiry in the Court’s annual reports, though it has been noted the 
General Court makes ‘avid use’ of them – something that makes sense given the 
nature of the cases within its jurisdiction i.e. ‘cases requiring a thorough 
investigation of complex facts’.44  
The defendant in a direct action must submit his defence ‘within two months 
after service on him of the application’ (Article 124). A reply from the applicant and 
rejoinder from the defendant may then be submitted in accordance with time-limits 
prescribed by the President of the Court (Article 126), normally within one month.45 
Article 135(2) provides that ‘a party may supplement his arguments and produce or 
offer evidence during the oral part of the procedure. The party must, however, give 
reasons for the delay in producing such further arguments or evidence’. Generally, 
‘[e]vidence offered in support by the parties must make out a plausible case for their 
allegations and so constitute at least prima facie evidence’. 46 However, the Rules 
specify only that evidence may be produced or offered ‘where appropriate’47 – in 
other words, there is no explicit obligation to submit evidence. 
 The Court also publishes Notes for the Guidance of Counsel, the current 
version of which dates from February 2009 i.e. before the current Rules took effect.48 
These Notes are ‘a working tool intended to enable Counsel to present their written 
and oral pleadings in the form which the Court of Justice considers most fitting’ (p3). 
They reemphasise that ‘the entire procedure before the Court, in particular the 
written phase, is governed by the principle whereby new pleas may not be raised in 
the course of the proceedings, with the sole exception of those based on matters of 
law and fact which come to light in the course of the procedure’ (p10). The purpose 
of the reply and the rejoinder in direct actions is fleshed out (p15), but it is also noted 
                                                     
43 2012 OJ L265/1. 
44 Lenaerts et al, n39 above, 557 (where the authors also note differences between the Rules of 
Procedure for the Court of Justice and for the General Court respectively for precisely this 
reason; for the General Court, see the consolidated Rules of Procedure at 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2008-09/txt7_2008-09-25_14-08-
6_431.pdf); outlining the different forms of measures of inquiry, see Lenaerts et al, 560-563. 
45 Article 128 outlines whether and when further evidence can be submitted at the reply or 
rejoinder stages of a direct action. For preliminary rulings, Article 96 establishes who may 
submit written observations to the Court, normally within two months (according to Article 
23 of the Statute): primarily, the parties to the national dispute, the Member States and the 
European Commission. 
46 Lenaerts et al, n39 above, 557. 
47 Articles 120 and 124 of the Rules of Procedure. 
48 Available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2008-09/txt9_2008-09-
25_17-37-52_275.pdf. 
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that ‘[w]ith a view to expediting the written procedure, the parties are requested 
seriously to contemplate the possibility of waiving the right to lodge them’. For 
preliminary rulings, the Notes advise: 
It must be emphasised that none of the parties is entitled to reply in writing to the 
written observations submitted by the others. Any response to the written 
observations of other parties must be made orally at the hearing…The 
submission of written observations is strongly recommended since the time allowed 
for oral argument at the hearing is strictly limited. However, any party who has 
not submitted written observations retains the right to present oral argument, 
in particular his responses to the written arguments, at the hearing, if a 
hearing is held (p16, emphasis added). 
This extract demonstrates that much of the burden of responding to claims made in 
the course of a preliminary ruling falls on the oral hearing.49 But it also stresses that 
the time available for that purpose is strictly limited.50 The pressures placed on the 
hearing are compounded by the Court’s tendency to reformulate questions sent to it 
by national courts and tribunals: on which framing of the dispute did the lawyers 
concentrate their submissions and pleadings (and thus, in turn, their evidence)?51 
The Court is clearly keen to keep written pleadings brief too. In the ‘Practice 
Directions relating to Direct Actions and Appeals’ – also published on the Court’s 
website – it is stated that ‘[i]t is the Court's experience that, save in exceptional 
circumstances, effective pleadings need not exceed 10 or 15 pages and replies, 
rejoinders and responses can be limited to 5 to 10 pages’. 52  Any additional 
documents must be submitted as annexes attached to the pleadings.53 Much of this is 
driven by the multilingual environment of the Court and the translation gymnastics 
that result in consequence, a theme that threads through the Notes too. Directly 
addressing ‘facts and evidence’, the Notes state simply that ‘[t]he initial pleadings 
                                                     
49 This is echoed on p23: ‘In the case of references for a preliminary ruling…the main purpose 
of the hearing is to allow the parties and other interested persons to reply to the arguments 
put forward by other participants in their written pleadings’ (emphasis added).  
50 ‘As a general rule, the period initially allowed to each main party is limited to a maximum 
of 20 minutes, limited…to a maximum of 15 minutes before Chambers composed of three 
Judges. The time allowed to interveners is limited to a maximum of 15 minutes….Having 
regard to the purpose of the hearing, experience shows that the time allowed for oral 
submissions is generally not fully used by Counsel accustomed to appearing before the 
Court. A period for oral submissions of less than 20 minutes is usually sufficient’ (p25). 
51 The absence of any reference to the applicant’s caring responsibilities in Case C-434/09 
McCarthy v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] ECR I-3375 is a striking recent 
example. The questions submitted by the national court concerned the granting of residence 
permits under Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family 
members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, 2004 OJ 
L158/77; but the Court widened the scope of the case to consider impediments to her 
movement rights in general – without any reflection on her role as the carer for her disabled 
son, which would surely affect her capacity to move. See N Nic Shuibhne ‘(Some Of) The 
Kids Are All Right: Comment on McCarthy and Dereci’ (2012) 49:1 CMLRev 349 at 367-372. 
52 Available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2009-
02/ins_prat2_2009-02-09_16-15-31_502.pdf; see para. 44. 
53 Article 57(4) of the Rules of Procedure. 
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must indicate all evidence in support of each of the points of fact at issue. However, 
new evidence may be put forward subsequently (in contrast to the rule excluding 
new pleas in law), provided that adequate reasons are given to justify the delay. The 
various forms of evidence upon which parties may rely are set out in Article [64(2)] 
of the [Rules of Procedure]’ (p20) – which is not, as we saw above, the most detailed 
of provisions to begin with.  
This brief overview of the procedural documents published for or by the 
Court shows that questions relating to evidence and proof are barely addressed. The 
basic governing principle is openness: in the sense that it is up to the parties to 
submit any evidence that they consider to be relevant, helpful, or appropriate; and to 
respond to claims made by other parties involved in the dispute – within the bounds 
of tightly constrained written and oral submissions. But that tells us very little about 
how arguments must be proven in more substantive terms; for that, the documentary 
guidance needs to be supplemented with instructions found in case law. 
 
5. Proving public interest: Unravelling the standard  
 
As noted in Section 2, free movement discourse normally focuses on the burden of 
proof i.e. which party in a dispute has the responsibility to substantiate (or refute) 
arguments presented. The standard of proof refers to the level or degree of evidence 
that they need to submit for that purpose. In the following paragraphs, we outline 
four key elements of the required standard of proof for free movement law, drawn 
from indicators scattered across the case law: (1) the scope of the dispute is framed 
by the arguments submitted; (2) mere assertions and generalisations are insufficient; 
(3) the evidence submitted must be ‘precise’; and (4) for the necessity element of 
proportionality review, it must be established that less restrictive measures vis-à-vis 
free movement could not sufficiently protect the public interest objective being 
asserted. Significantly, there has been a marked shift in recent case law towards 
positive expression of and engagement with the standard of proof, which contrasts 
with the negative guidance more prevalent before i.e. it was merely stated that 
Member States had not reached the required standard without discussion of how they 
might actually do so. We also use this discussion to highlight the problems outlined 
at the beginning of the article with respect to both the challenging nature of public 
interest arguments and the role of evidence – and of courts – in evaluating them. 
 
a. The scope of the discussion is framed by the arguments submitted  
This may seem like an utterly obvious point; but we include it here, first, because 
States seem still to fail to grasp and act on it. This can be seen most starkly when no 
justification arguments are submitted at all. Primarily, the responsibility here lies 
squarely with defendant States – or more specifically, with their lawyers: if they fail 
to consider whether public interest reasons underpinned a contested measure, then 
they have no one to blame but themselves. But, second, in preliminary references, 
there is a potential role for the referring court too. For example, in Accor, after a 
restriction of freedom of establishment was confirmed, the Court stated that ‘[n]either 
the national court nor the parties which submitted observations have provided 
evidence to justify that restriction. It must therefore be held that Article 49 TFEU 
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precludes legislation such as that at issue’.54 This reference to the national court 
suggests that the Court considers (expects?) national judges to be actively involved 
in setting the scope of the dispute and steering the submission of relevant evidence. 
This could be viewed as placing responsibility on the national judge to reflect the 
parties’ representations properly when constructing the preliminary reference; but it 
may go so far as expecting national judges actively to prompt justification and 
proportionality angles before sending a reference if the State has not done so itself. 
In some instances, national courts expressly include questions about evidence 
and proof in their references. In ATRAL, for example, one of the questions from the 
Belgian Conseil d’État sought ‘to ascertain whether a Member State which claims 
such justification may merely rely on it in the abstract or must specifically 
demonstrate its genuineness.’55 The Court responded that ‘justification can only be 
specifically demonstrated by reference to the circumstances of the case’.56 Similarly, 
in Fachverband der Buch- und Medienwirtschaft, the referring Austrian court queried 
whether the national statutory obligation to sell books at a fixed price was justified 
by reference to Article 36 TFEU, ‘on the basis that its purpose is, very generally, 
described as the need to have regard to the status of books as cultural assets, to 
consumers’ interest in reasonable prices for books, and to the commercial 
characteristics of the book trade…notwithstanding the lack of empirical data which could 
prove that a statutory obligation to sell books at the fixed price is a suitable means for 
achieving the intended purposes’.57 However, as noted earlier, national procedures 
on evidence and proof can differ considerably, which will influence how as well as 
the extent to which national judges engage with these issues when framing their 
references. If the Court does envisage a positive obligation on national judges in the 
way suggested by cases like Accor, then this should be confirmed more explicitly. 
 
b. Assertions and generalisations will never satisfy the standard of proof  
Neither merely asserting the relevance of a public interest objective nor grounding the 
argument in generalisations will be enough to meet the required standard of proof.58 
For example, in Commission v Portugal (Golden shares), the Government’s holding of 
shares in EDP (the principal licensed distributor of electricity in Portugal), which 
conferred special rights on it as a shareholder, amounted to a restriction on the free 
movement of capital. It submitted a justification argument about the risk of serious 
threats to the security of its energy supply and the Court conceded that ‘[t]hat 
argument is not entirely without merit. However, since the Portuguese Republic has 
done no more than raise that ground relating to the security of the energy supply, 
                                                     
54 Case C-310/09 Ministre du Budget, des Comptes publics et de la Fonction publique v Accor SA, 
judgment of 15 September 2011, para. 63 (emphasis added). 
55 Case C-14/02 ATRAL SA v Belgian State [2003] ECR I-4431, para. 66 (emphasis added). 
56 Ibid para. 67. 
57 Case C-531/07 Fachverband der Buch- und Medienwirtschaft v LIBRO Handelsgesellschaft mbH 
[2009] ECR I-3717, para. 13 (emphasis added). The Court did not address the evidential issue; 
it concluded in one line that ‘the objective of the protection of books as cultural objects can be 
achieved by measures less restrictive for the importer’ (para. 35). 
58  E.g. Case C-333/08 Commission v France [2010] ECR I-757, para. 97: ‘the generalised 
presumption of a health risk put forward…is not supported by evidence’. 
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without stating clearly the exact reasons why it considers that the special rights at 
issue…would make it possible to prevent such an interference with a fundamental 
interest of society, a justification based on public security cannot be upheld’.59  
 An extensive reflection on generalisations vis-à-vis the ‘relevant evidentiary 
burden’ can be found in Commission v Poland, a case about the compatibility of 
restrictions in national law on the circulation of genetically modified seed varieties 
with obligations under EU legislation.60 The case concerned Union harmonisation 
measures, so it is not a classic free movement dispute. However, the Court did 
consider the scope of the primary Treaty provisions. Outlining the conditions 
relevant to derogation from Article 34 TFEU, it reasoned: 
[T]he relevant evidentiary burden is not discharged by statements as general as 
those put forward by that Member State…consisting in references to fears 
regarding the environment and public health and to the strong opposition to 
GMOs manifested by the Polish people, or even to the fact that the 
administrative regional assemblies adopted resolutions declaring that the 
administrative regions are to be kept free of genetically modified cultures and 
GMOs...[A]s regards the more specifically religious or ethical arguments put 
forward…for the first time in the defence and rejoinder…it must be held that 
that Member State has failed to establish that the contested national 
provisions were in fact adopted on the basis of such considerations. The Republic 
of Poland essentially referred to a sort of general presumption…[S]uch 
considerations are not sufficient to establish that the adoption of the 
contested national provisions was in fact inspired by the ethical and religious 
considerations described in the defence and the rejoinder, especially since the 
Republic of Poland had, in the pre-litigation procedure, based its defence 
mainly on the shortcomings allegedly affecting [the relevant Directive].61 
The positive expression of the Court’s stance here is that there must be an established 
causal link between the justification submitted and the contested national measure. 
The Court considers that it is ‘required to examine a justification…only in so far as it 
is common ground or properly established that the national legislation concerned does in 
fact pursue the purposes that the defendant Member State attributes to it’. 62  The 
reference to ‘common ground’ relates to claims that are not disputed in the course of 
the proceedings.63 It is also interesting to note a possible adjustment to a point noted 
in Section 3 above: although a Member State can raise defence arguments that were 
not part of the pre-litigation procedure, does a stronger evidentiary burden attach to 
such late-stage assertions (‘especially since’)? 
                                                     
59 Case C-543/08 Commission v Portugal (Golden shares) [2010] ECR I-11241, para. 87 (emphasis 
added). See similarly, Case C-112/05 Commission v Germany [2007] ECR I-8995, esp. paras 74 
and 80; references to the State’s failure to ‘explain’ its justification arguments sufficiently 
contrasts notably with the extensive discussion of evidence at the restriction stage. 
60 Case C-165/08 Commission v Poland (Genetically modified organisms) [2009] ECR I-6843. 
61 Ibid paras 54-59 (emphasis added). 
62 Ibid para. 53 (emphasis added). 
63 E.g. Case C-320/03 Commission v Austria [2005] ECR I-9871, para. 71; Case C-141/07 
Commission v Germany (Pharmacies) [2008] ECR I-6935, para. 47. 
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If justification arguments are properly demonstrated, and thus accepted in 
principle, the defendant State must also evidence the proportionality of its actions i.e. 
it must show that the national measure is both appropriate and necessary to attain 
the public interest pursued.64 Similarly, where a State does no more than assert that 
the measure is proportionate, the Court concludes that the evidence required to 
substantiate that position is lacking. In this context, the Court has stated that the 
burden of proof ‘cannot be so extensive as to require the Member State to prove, 
positively, that no other conceivable measure could enable that objective to be 
attained under the same conditions’.65 We consider, however, that this guidance 
connects more appropriately to the standard of proof – and, in fact, the Court has 
since recast the test in that language.66 These questions are picked up in subsection 
(d) below in the discussion on less restrictive measures. 
 
c. The evidence submitted to substantiate argument(s) must be ‘precise’  
An established but nonspecific requirement that ‘the reasons which may be invoked 
by a Member State by way of justification must be accompanied by an analysis of the 
appropriateness and proportionality of the restrictive measure’67 has been amplified 
in recent case law through the addition of an obligation to provide ‘precise evidence 
enabling [the State’s] arguments to be substantiated’.68 The Court has used different 
adjectives – e.g. ‘specific evidence’;69 ‘appropriate evidence’;70 ‘conclusive evidence’71 
– but the common thread is that such evidence must substantiate the arguments. 
Where scientific data is relied upon, it must be ‘the results of international scientific 
research’ and the ‘latest scientific data available at the date of the adoption of [the 
national] decision’.72 
More generally, however, how precise/specific/conclusive does the evidence 
submitted actually have to be; in other words, what are the criteria of evaluation? 
Focusing on proportionality review, AG Sharpston has interpreted the required 
                                                     
64 Commission v Spain (Shopping centres), para. 75; Commission v Italy (Trailers), para. 66. 
65 Commission v Italy (Trailers), para. 66. The Court developed this standard by analogy with 
competition law; see e.g. Case C-157/94 Commission v Netherlands [1997] ECR I-5699, para. 58 
(cited in Trailers). 
66 Case C-542/09 Commission v Netherlands (Access to education), judgment of 14 June 2012, para. 
85. 
67 Case C-42/02 Lindman [2003] ECR I-13519 , para. 25 (emphasis added). 
68 Case C-254/05 Commission v Belgium [2007] ECR I-4269, para. 36 (emphasis added); see 
similarly e.g. Case C-161/07 Commission v Austria [2008] ECR I-10671, paras 36-37.  
69 Case C-147/03 Commission v Austria (Access to universities) [2005] ECR I-5969, para. 63. 
70 Case C-319/06 Commission v Luxembourg [2008] ECR I-4323, para. 51. 
71 Commission v Spain (Shopping centres), para. 62. 
72 Case C-95/01 Criminal proceedings against Greenham and Abel [2004] ECR I-1333, paras 40 and 
42, in the context of an alleged risk to public health. The Court also confirmed that ‘an 
assessment of the risk could reveal that scientific uncertainty persists as regards the existence 
or extent of real risks to human health. In such circumstances…a Member State may, in 
accordance with the precautionary principle, take protective measures without having to wait 
until the existence and gravity of those risks are fully demonstrated…However, the risk 
assessment cannot be based on purely hypothetical considerations’ (para. 43). 
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standard as meaning that a State ‘bears the onus of establishing a prima facie case’.73 
She then outlined the Commission’s responsibilities in direct actions, which are ‘to 
rebut the Member State’s analysis by suggesting other less restrictive measures. The 
Commission cannot merely propose an alternative measure. It must also explain why and 
how that measure is appropriate to achieve the stated objective(s) and is, above all, 
less restrictive…Without such an explanation, the defendant Member State cannot 
know on what its rebuttal should focus’.74  
Despite the fact that States are (very) frequently told that they have asserted a 
public interest objective but not actually proven it, it is astonishing to observe how 
regularly the Court still makes this finding. The judgment in Commission v Austria 
(Access to universities) is one of the most striking and well-known examples in recent 
years: in fact, the shift from negative findings to more positive engagement with the 
required standard of proof in the case law can be traced to this significant turning 
point. To defend differential (more onerous) university entry requirements for 
holders of qualifications from other Member States, Austria raised arguments about 
preventing abuse of EU law and obligations under international conventions; 
however, in particular, it ‘invoke[d]…safeguarding of the homogeneity of the 
Austrian education system’.75 The Court responded initially that ‘excessive demand 
for access to specific courses could be met by the adoption of specific non-
discriminatory measures such as the establishment of an entry examination or the 
requirement of a minimum grade’76 and that ‘the risks alleged by the Republic of 
Austria are not exclusive to its higher or university education system but have been 
and are suffered by other Member States’.77 Then, recalling the obligation on States to 
provide specific evidence supporting its arguments, the Court continued: 
In the present case, the Republic of Austria simply maintained at the hearing 
that the number of students registering for courses in medicine could be five 
times the number of available places, which would pose a risk to the financial 
equilibrium of the Austrian higher education system and, consequently, to its 
very existence. It must be pointed out that no estimates relating to other courses 
have been submitted to the Court and that the Republic of Austria has conceded 
that it does not have any figures in that connection. Moreover, the Austrian 
authorities have accepted that the national legislation in question is essentially 
preventive in nature. Consequently…the Republic of Austria has failed to 
demonstrate that, in the absence of [the contested measure], the existence of 
the Austrian education system in general and the safeguarding of the 
homogeneity of higher education in particular would be jeopardised.78 
                                                     
73 AG Sharpston in Commission v Netherlands (Access to education), para. 68 of the Opinion, who 
had remarked that ‘I should like to comment on the principles governing the burden of proof 
and the standard of proof. I do so because neither party in this case has applied those 
principles properly’ (para. 67). 
74 Ibid para. 70 (emphasis added); less restrictive measures are addressed in subsection (d) 
below. 
75 Commission v Austria (Access to universities), para. 50. 
76 Ibid para. 61. 
77 Ibid 62. 
78 Ibid paras 64-66 (emphasis added). 
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AG Jacobs was similarly ‘not convinced’ by Austria’s assertions, but he did not raise 
the proof angle and had engaged with the merits of the arguments submitted over 
more than 20 paragraphs in his Opinion. 
Clearly, a basic point made above applies equally here: States have to take 
responsibility for making better arguments. At that level, lack of effort on the part of 
defendant States is purely their own fault. But it has to be acknowledged too that the 
longstanding absence of more detailed positive guidance, compounded by differing 
national approaches to evidence and proof, brings another perspective to the 
problem. It is easier to discern from the case law what kind of ‘evidence’ will not 
meet the required standard of proof than to appreciate what does. In other words, 
we found abundant examples of the language of proof before Commission v Austria, 
but relatively little elaboration of its substance. It was often genuinely difficult to 
decipher the basis for the conclusions drawn by the Court; but it is the Court’s 
judgments that State lawyers will depend on and draw from to prepare their cases, 
again noting the absence of more detailed procedural rules shown in Section 4.  
In seeking to understand what ‘precise’ evidence means more clearly, 
consider the following extract from Gourmet International Products, a case about 
Swedish advertising restrictions for alcoholic beverages: 
Even without its being necessary to carry out a precise analysis of the facts 
characteristic of the Swedish situation, which it is for the national court to do, 
the Court is able to conclude that, in the case of products like alcoholic 
beverages…a prohibition of all advertising directed at consumers…is liable to 
impede access to the market by products from other Member States more 
than it impedes access by domestic products, with which consumers are 
instantly more familiar. The information provided by the Consumer 
Ombudsman and the Swedish Government concerning the relative increase 
in Sweden in the consumption of wine and whisky, which are mainly 
imported, in comparison with other products such as vodka, which is mainly 
of Swedish origin, does not alter that conclusion. First, it cannot be precluded 
that, in the absence of the legislation at issue in the main proceedings, the 
change indicated would have been greater; second, that information takes 
into account only some alcoholic beverages and ignores, in particular, beer 
consumption.79 
How did the Court assess the precision of the ‘information provided’? The second 
reason supporting the fact that the evidence did not ‘alter the conclusion’ made by 
the Court seems to be empirically based; but how could the first reason (or 
speculation) be disproved? At one level, discussions and analyses of evidence are 
necessarily case-specific, meaning that more general rules or principles cannot easily 
be extracted and then transmitted to different circumstances – different in the sense 
of the kind of national measure involved, or the public interest objective involved, or 
the kind of evidence that might be relevant in the first place. The purpose of this 
research was not to second-guess or call into question the substantive conclusions 
reached by the Court in any given case – something that is, in any event, impossible 
to do without sight of the case files.  
                                                     
79  Case C-405/98 Konsumentombudsmannen (KO) v Gourmet International Products AB (GIP) 
[2001] ECR I-1795, paras 21-22 (emphasis added). 
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However, what it is possible to evaluate is the existence of a broader culture of 
proof, which would be constructed by extensive and transparent flagging of and 
engagement with the evidence submitted in each case. For example, the Court 
frequently points to particular pieces of evidence (e.g. expert studies or reports) to 
rationalise its evaluation of justification arguments,80 but it does not contextualise 
that evidence in terms of the overall quantum of material submitted or by providing 
information about the author (or the institutional purpose or perspectives of the 
author). How can we gauge why particular weight has been attached to one study 
that seems to be central to and not just illustrative of the Court’s reasoning when it 
rejects justification arguments?81 How do we know whether – and when – the Court 
relies on expert evidence in shaping its conclusions or applies a more intuitive 
rationale: essentially, common sense?  
It might have been assumed that reviewing reports for the hearing in similar 
past cases was a useful exercise for litigants in this respect. From that perspective, the 
abolition of these reports in 2012 is to be regretted. But there was hardly any 
discussion of evidence in the reports for the hearing that we reviewed for the 
purposes of this study (e.g. to compare the report for Commission v Austria with the 
report for Bressol, a case returned to below); in sharp contrast to the more detailed 
and discursive reports still prepared for EFTA Court cases – which are also 
published online.82 The relative caseloads of and translation demands on the two 
Courts must of course be remembered; but logistics did not have to affect the content 
of the reports and the way in which evidence is/was discussed therein.  
 These points are well illustrated by comparing the Court’s approach in 
Commission v Austria with its subsequent preliminary ruling on the Belgian 
university access restrictions challenged in Bressol.83 The contested rules restricted 
access to nine medical or paramedical programmes, on the basis of concerns about 
teaching quality and the sustainability of the affected region’s health infrastructure 
owing to a significant increase in student numbers from other States (especially 
France). Students who met codified residence criteria had open access to the 
programmes; all other students were subject to a 30% threshold rule, the places for 
which were assigned through the drawing of lots. The Court did not hesitate to find 
that the rules contravened EU discrimination law (applying Articles 18 and 21 
TFEU). But the extensive discussion on justification that then followed was markedly 
different from the terse judgment in Commission v Austria.  
It was first stated, without really explaining why, that while ‘it cannot be 
excluded…that the prevention of a risk to the existence of a national education 
                                                     
80 E.g. Case C-463/01 Commission v Germany [2004] ECR I-11705, para. 60; Case 90/86 Criminal 
proceedings against Zoni [1988] ECR 4285, para. 27. 
81 Or indeed, accepts them: e.g. Case C-137/09 Josemans v Burgemeester van Maastricht [2010] 
ECR I-13019, paras 80-81. 
82 E.g. on the free movement of goods, see Case E-16/10 Philip Morris Norway AS v Norwegian 
State, represented by the Ministry of Health and Care Services [2011] EFTA Court Report 330; the 
report for the hearing – in which there are substantive references to evidence and the 
arguments submitted as well as responded to in that respect – is available at 
http://www.eftacourt.int/uploads/tx_nvcases/16_10_RH_Rev_EN.pdf.  
83  Case C-73/08 Bressol and Others and Céline Chaverot and Others v Gouvernement de la 
Communauté française [2010] ECR I-2735. 
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system and to its homogeneity may justify a difference in treatment between some 
students…the matters put forward as justification in that regard are the same as 
those linked to the protection of public health, since all the courses concerned fall 
within that field. They must, therefore, be examined only in the light of the justifications 
relating to the safeguarding of public health’.84 It is difficult to know whether this was 
intended as an equating of public interest objectives, or an instrumentally 
sympathetic steering of the case towards focusing on public health more specifically. 
The latter is perhaps supported by the Court’s citation of Apothekerkammer des 
Saarlandes, in which it made the following statement: 
When assessing whether that obligation has been complied with, account 
must be taken of the fact that the health and life of humans rank foremost among 
the assets and interests protected by the Treaty and that it is for the Member 
States to determine the level of protection which they wish to afford to public 
health and the way in which that level is to be achieved. Since the level may vary 
from one Member State to another, Member States must be allowed discretion.85 
This principle can be traced through an established line of public health case law; but 
as will become even more apparent through the discussion on proportionality below, 
the affirmation of State discretion here is not something that is protected uniformly 
across the case law. For example, the Court applied more standard reasoning in 
Albore addressing an area of potentially acute national concern:  
A mere reference to the requirements of defence of the national territory cannot 
suffice to justify discrimination on grounds of nationality…The position 
would be different only if it were demonstrated, for each area to which the 
restriction applies, that non-discriminatory treatment of the nationals of all 
the Member States would expose the military interests of the Member State 
concerned to real, specific and serious risks which could not be countered by less 
restrictive procedures.86  
The measures challenged in Albore were directly discriminatory; and it could be 
argued that the threshold of justification is rightly higher in such cases – a point 
underscored by the fact that States are (usually) confined to express Treaty 
derogations in such cases. But less severe restrictions are considered to be just as 
problematic in other cases.87 Also, the use of proportionality as a policy tool to effect 
a differentiated public interest agenda is clearly apparent in certain sectors of free 
movement law e.g. to mediate national sensitivities about challenges to gambling 
restrictions, where a more procedural than substantive proportionality review tends 
to be applied.88  
                                                     
84 Ibid paras 53-54 (emphasis added). 
85 Case C-171/07 Apothekerkammer des Saarlandes and others [2009] ECR I-4171, para. 19 
(emphasis added). 
86 Case C-423/98 Albore [2000] ECR I-5965, paras 21-22 (emphasis added). 
87 See e.g. the Opinion of AG Trstenjak in Case C-319/05 Commission v Germany [2007] ECR I-
9811 at para. 79: ‘[a]gainst the background of the high justification requirements…imposed on 
the Member States, the mere blanket reference by the German Government to possible health 
risks…cannot be sufficient to justify such a drastic measure as the refusal of market access’ 
(emphasis added). 
88  E.g. see e.g. Case C-275/92 Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise v Schindler [1994] ECR I-1039, 
Case C-42/07 Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional and Bwin International Ltd v Departamento de 
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In Josemans, the Court conveyed a similar level of trust in the appraisal of the 
defendant State at the stage of proportionality review; and it is again difficult to 
avoid concluding that the sensitive subject matter played a part in that deference – a 
theme already identified above. Addressing whether it was possible to restrict access 
to coffee-shops in Maastricht in a manner that was less restrictive of cross-border 
services than the contested residence requirement, the Court noted that ‘according to 
the case-file…various measures relating to combating drug tourism and the 
accompanying public nuisance have been implemented…According to the information 
provided by the Burgemeester van Maastricht and the Netherlands Government, those 
measures have nevertheless proved to be insufficient and ineffective in the light of 
the objective pursued’.89 The Court concluded: 
Member States cannot be denied the possibility of pursuing the objective of 
combating drug tourism and the accompanying public nuisance by the 
introduction of general rules which are easily managed and supervised by 
the national authorities…[N]othing in the case-file gives grounds to assume that 
the objective pursued could be achieved to the extent envisaged by the rules 
at issue…by granting non-residents access to coffee-shops whilst refusing to 
sell them cannabis. In such circumstances, it must be stated that rules such as 
those at issue in the main proceedings are suitable for attaining the objective of 
combating drug tourism and the accompanying public nuisance and do not go 
beyond what is necessary in order to attain it.90  
If the Court does conceive of a sliding scale of justification grounds, mapped onto a 
similarly gradated proportionality scale – if some public interests are more important 
than others, in other words – it needs to say so and to articulate the correspondingly 
variegated adjudicative framework more explicitly. What other ‘assets and interests’ 
sit alongside public health at the apex of public concern? Do any interests rank even 
more highly? These questions should be reflected on by the Court in a much more 
systematic way than we have seen to date.91 
In any event, in Bressol, the Court confirmed that ‘a difference in treatment 
based indirectly on nationality may be justified by the objective of maintaining a 
balanced high-quality medical service open to all, in so far as it contributes to 
                                                                                                                                                        
Jogos da Santa Casa da Misericórdia de Lisboa [2009] ECR I-7633, and Case C-258/08 Ladbrokes 
Betting & Gaming Ltd and Ladbrokes International Ltd v Stichting de Nationale Sporttotalisator 
[2010] ECR I-4757; and, for analysis, S Planzer, ‘The ECJ on gambling addiction: absence of an 
evidence-oriented approach’ (2010) 1:3 European Journal of Risk Regulation 289 and S van den 
Bogaert and A Cuyvers, ‘Money for nothing: The case law of the EU Court of Justice on the 
regulation of gambling’ (2011) 48:4 CMLR 1175 esp. 1206-1210. See generally, G Mathisen 
‘Consistency and coherence as conditions for justification of Member State measures 
restricting free movement’ (2010) 47:5 CMLRev 1021.  
89 Josemans, para. 80 (emphasis added). 
90 Ibid paras 82-83 (emphasis added). 
91 For an argument about protecting a specific category of public interest grounds in a 
distinctive way, see e.g. F de Witte, ‘Sex, drugs and EU law: The recognition of moral, ethical 
and cultural diversity in EU law’ (2013) 50 CMLRev, forthcoming. 
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achieving a high level of protection of health’.92 It was then emphasised that the 
determination of proportionality was a matter for the national court, but that the 
Court of Justice ‘may provide guidance based on the documents relating to the main 
proceedings and on the written and oral observations which have been submitted to 
it, in order to enable the national court to give judgment’.93 The Court then engaged 
in substantive discussion of the Belgian rules vis-à-vis public health as a policy 
objective, outlining precise ‘guidance’ for the national court about what it should 
consider when assessing the State’s interest in ensuring the quality and sustainability 
of training for future health professionals, including the specific challenges of 
undertaking an essentially prospective analysis.94 It restated the proof threshold of 
showing ‘that such risks actually exist’ and the standard guidance about precise 
evidence to substantiate the arguments – but here, critically, in a much more 
developed form than we saw before: ‘[s]uch an objective, detailed analysis, supported by 
figures, must be capable of demonstrating, with solid and consistent data, that there are 
genuine risks to public health’.95 The Court then outlined even more precisely what 
the national court had to examine regarding relevant student numbers:  
[T]hat analysis cannot just refer to the figures concerning one or other group of 
students and infer, in particular, that at the end of their studies all the non-
resident students will establish themselves in the State in which they resided 
before commencing their studies…[The] analysis must take into account the 
impact of the group of non-resident students on the pursuit of the objective of 
ensuring the availability of professionals within the French Community [and] 
the possibility that resident students may decide to exercise their profession 
in a State other than the Kingdom of Belgium at the end of their studies. 
Equally, it must take into account the extent to which persons who have not 
studied within the French Community may establish themselves there later in 
order to exercise one of those professions.96 
The Court also commented on the burden of proof, noting that ‘[i]t is for the 
competent authorities to provide the referring court with an analysis which satisfies 
those requirements’.97  
The Court in Bressol provided more than ‘guidance’ for the referring court: it 
shared comprehensive standard of proof tips with a defendant State. On one view, 
Belgium’s good fortune was to have its university access restrictions assessed 
through the preliminary rulings procedure rather than in a new direct action – the 
Commission had already (successfully) challenged Belgian university access 
                                                     
92 Bressol, para. 62, drawing directly from more proof-primed case law on gender equality 
(Case C-187/00 Kutz-Bauer v Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg [2003] ECR I-2741, para. 52; and 
Joined Cases C-4/02 and C-5/02 Schönheit and Becker [2003] ECR I-12575, para. 83). 
93 Bressol, para. 65. 
94 Ibid paras 66-70. 
95 Ibid para. 71 (emphasis added). The express requirement of empirical data here seems to 
contradict softer guidance found elsewhere in the case law for the analysis of proportionality, 
returned to below. 
96 Ibid para. 73.  
97 Ibid para. 74. The Court went on to provide similarly detailed guidance about how the 
referring court should determine proportionality if it was satisfied that genuine risks to the 
protection of public health were established. 
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restrictions through the infringement route. 98 In that case, the Court noted that 
Belgium did ‘not put forward any argument capable of justifying’ the ‘criterion of 
differentiation’ that disadvantaged non-Belgian nationals and confirmed that 
Belgium had failed to fulfil its obligations under EU law.99 In Bressol, AG Sharpston 
did not provide the Belgian authorities with an evidentiary second chance, 
concluding directly that neither the public health nor education policy arguments 
justified the restrictions placed on the free movement of students and not giving any 
indications about the nature of the evidence needed to arrive at that finding. Her 
decisiveness renews questions about the appropriate division of functions between 
the Court and national courts. Relatedly, it is worth noting that the recurring and 
constitutionally delicate irony here is that the Court’s most extensive discussion of 
‘precise’ evidence in the case law up to that point occurred not in a direct action, but 
in the Bressol preliminary ruling. The broader political shading of the Commission’s 
decision not to pursue a second set of infringement proceedings against Belgium 
before the indirect challenge materialised through Bressol – a decision attributed to 
ensuring smooth passage for the Lisbon Treaty and the stinging public criticism of 
the Court post Commission v Austria100 – also even more difficult questions about 
instrumental use of the standard of proof, something that is wholly objectionable on 
rule of law grounds and is returned to below. 
 
d. Proportionality and less restrictive measures 
In order to prove the proportionality of national measures taken for legitimate public 
interest reasons, Member States are required ‘not only to establish that the…measure 
at issue is proportionate to the objective pursued but also to indicate the evidence 
capable of substantiating that conclusion’.101 For direct actions, this is a decision that 
the Court must make itself; but for preliminary rulings, ‘it is for the referring court to 
assess whether the legislation at issue in the main proceedings goes beyond what is 
necessary to attain the stated objective’. 102  The Court normally completes that 
sentence as follows: ‘that is, whether it could be attained by less restrictive 
measures’. The yardstick of the less restrictive measure is well entrenched in the 
Court’s proportionality framework. What we observed, however, is that guidance 
about how actually to discover or assess it varies. For preliminary rulings, the fact that 
national judges will probably have to undertake a different character of 
proportionality review under EU law than they do in national law underlines the 
need for clarity and consistency on this point:103 against the standard grain, national 
courts and tribunals are consistently directed towards displacing the proportionality 
                                                     
98 Case C-65/03 Commission v Belgium [2004] ECR I-6427. 
99 Ibid paras 30-31. 
100 See S Garben, case comment, (2010) 47:5 CMLRev 1493 at 1496-7. 
101 Commission v Netherlands (Access to education), para. 82. 
102 Bressol, para. 77.. 
103 The judgments in The Queen on the Application of Sinclair Collis Limited v The Secretary of State 
for Health (High Court of Justice Court of Appeal (Civil Division) [2011] EWCA Civ 437) 
provide apt illustration of the degree to which national judges are relatively more open or 
closed to both the language and substantive assessments of EU-based proportionality review; 
it is interesting to observe how the framing and application of proportionality (for a health-
grounded restriction of Article 34 TFEU) frequently returns to national touchstones. 
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assessments of national legislatures to resolve free movement disputes. More 
generally, the way in which proportionality analysis blurs the lines between judicial 
review of political choices and judicially making fresh or substituted political choices 
through that process – a distinction that is more sharply preserved in cases assessing 
Union legislative measures104 – further heightens the potential for tension. 
Substantive criteria on less restrictive measures can be distilled from patterns 
that emerge in the case law e.g. information and labelling rules are more salvageable 
than product requirements;105 and preventive measures are more salvageable than 
reparative ones.106 It is part of the responsibility placed on States to respond to 
examples of less restrictive measures advanced by the Commission during 
infringement proceedings. For example, reviewing Portuguese legislation that 
prohibited the fixing of tinted film to motor vehicle windows, the Court reiterated 
that the burden of proof falls first on the Commission; but that ‘it is incumbent on the 
defendant Member State to contest substantively and in detail the information 
produced and the consequences thereof’.107 It then found the national measure to be 
‘excessive’: ‘[a]s stated by the Commission at the hearing, there is a wide range of 
tinted film, from transparent film to film which is almost opaque. That information, 
which was not challenged by the Portuguese Republic, means that at least some films, 
namely those with a sufficient degree of transparency, permit the desired visual 
inspection of the interior of motor vehicles’.108 Any acknowledgement by a State of 
an alternative, less restrictive route to achieving the public interest objective will be 
fatal to its defence.109  
But it is harder to get a more precise sense of what States need to demonstrate 
or how far their diagnoses have to reach. The key concern in this context is the extent 
to which there is variation in the Court’s guidance. As noted earlier, ‘the burden of 
proof cannot be so extensive as to require the Member State to prove, positively, that 
no other conceivable measure could enable that objective to be attained under the same 
conditions’.110 However, in Stoß and others, in the context of restrictions on gambling, 
the Court seemed nonetheless to project a demanding standard. It first noted that 
‘the referring courts are in doubt as to whether, in order to justify restrictive 
measures…the national authorities must be able to produce a study supporting the 
proportionality of those measures which was prior to their adoption’.111 The Court 
                                                     
104 See AG Kokott in Case C-558/07 The Queen, on the application of S.P.C.M. SA, C.H. Erbslöh 
KG, Lake Chemicals and Minerals Ltd and Hercules Inc. v Secretary of State for the Environment, 
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12213, paras 65-75. 
106 E.g. Joined Cases C-515/99 and C-527-99 to C-540/99 Reisch and others [2002] ECR I-2157, 
para. 36. 
107 Case C-265/06 Commission v Portugal (Tinted film) [2008] ECR I-2245, para. 35 (emphasis 
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108 Ibid para. 36 (emphasis added). 
109 E.g. Case C-443/10 Bonnarde v Agence de Services et de Paiement, judgment of 6 October 2011, 
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110 Commission v Italy (Trailers), para. 66 (emphasis added).  
111 Joined Cases C-316/07, C-358/07 to C-360/07, C-409/07 and C-410/07 Stoß and others [2010] 
ECR I-8069, para. 70 (emphasis added). 
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considered that ‘if a Member State wishes to rely on an objective capable of justifying 
an obstacle to the freedom to provide services arising from a national restrictive 
measure, it is under a duty to supply the court called upon to rule on that question 
with all the evidence of such a kind as to enable the latter to be satisfied that the said 
measure does indeed fulfil the requirements arising from the principle of 
proportionality’.112 However, it was conceded that ‘it cannot…be inferred…that a 
Member State is deprived of the possibility of establishing that an internal restrictive 
measure satisfies those requirements, solely on the ground that that Member State is not 
able to produce studies serving as the basis for [its] adoption’.113  
At a very general level, the Court stipulates that ‘[i]f a Member State has a 
choice between various measures to attain the same objective it should choose the 
means which least restricts [free movement]’. 114  Sometimes, it gauges the 
proportionality of national measures by engaging in a comparative review of 
solutions adopted in other States.115 But it has also confirmed that ‘the fact that one 
Member State imposes less strict rules than another Member State does not mean 
that the latter’s rules are disproportionate’.116 In another example of variation, the 
Court normally uses the requirements of EU law to mark the parameters of 
proportionality assessment. 117  But, in other cases, it protects a space for State 
difference by referring to ‘the circumstances of law and of fact which characterise the 
situation in the Member State concerned’ 118  – with the potential for national 
discretion augmented when the Court accepts that ‘the decision as to whether the 
prohibition…at issue in the main proceedings is proportionate…calls for an analysis 
of the circumstances of law and of fact which characterise the situation in the 
Member State concerned, which the national court is in a better position than the Court of 
Justice to carry out’.119  
In another access to education case, Commission v Netherlands, the defendant 
State – seeking to rationalise against the free movement of workers a residence 
requirement attached to eligibility for portable funding of higher education at 
institutions outside the Netherlands (a student must, among other conditions, have 
lawfully resided in the Netherlands for at least three of the six years preceding 
enrolment) – ‘contended that no other rule would protect as efficiently the interests 
                                                     
112 Ibid para. 71 (emphasis added), referring to Case C-227/06 Commission v Belgium [2008] 
ECR I-46, paras 62 and 63. 
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which the [contested measure] is intended to protect. A requirement to the effect that 
the student must know the national language or have a diploma from a Netherlands 
school would not be an effective means of promoting the objective 
pursued…[B]esides the fact that such requirements would give rise to discrimination 
on grounds of nationality, those criteria would make sense only if they related to 
studies in the Netherlands’.120 But the Court responded that ‘it is not sufficient for 
that Member State simply to refer to two alternative measures which, in its opinion, are 
even more discriminatory than the requirement laid down’. 121  Then, noting that 
‘[a]dmittedly, the Court has ruled that the standard of proof cannot be so high as to 
require the Member State to prove, positively, that no other conceivable measure 
could enable the objective pursued to be attained under the same conditions’, the 
Court affirmed that the Netherlands ‘would have needed at least to show why it 
opted for the “three out of six years” rule, to the exclusion of all other representative 
elements’.122 Those two statements seem to be less far apart than might have been 
intended in terms of the standard of proof being set down. 
Recent case law on rules regulating the use of goods exemplifies the problem 
of variation. In the Trailers case – reviewing a prohibition on the towing of trailers by 
mopeds – AG Bot found it ‘difficult to accept that the contested measure could meet 
the requirement of proportionality’. 123  Among other arguments, he suggested 
examples of less restrictive regulatory options to achieve the objective of road safety:  
It would be appropriate, for example, to define which itineraries in Italy are 
considered to be fraught with risks – such as mountain crossings, motorways 
or even particularly heavily used public highways – for the purpose of laying 
down sectoral prohibitions or limitations. That alternative would reduce the 
risks arising from the use of trailers and would certainly be less restrictive of 
trade…[I]t was incumbent on the Italian authorities to examine closely, before 
adopting as radical a measure as a general and absolute prohibition, the possibility 
of resorting to measures less restrictive of freedom of movement and not to 
reject them unless it was clearly established that they were not consonant 
with the aim pursued. However, it does not appear from the case-file that the 
national authorities carried out any such examination124 
By contract, the Court first stated, in one line, that ‘the prohibition in question is 
appropriate for the purpose of ensuring road safety’.125 Then, turning to necessity, the 
Court was remarkably hands-off: 
[I]n the field of road safety a Member State may determine the degree of 
protection which it wishes to apply in regard to such safety and the way in which 
that degree of protection is to be achieved. Since that degree of protection may 
vary from one Member State to the other, Member States must be allowed a 
margin of appreciation…[T]he Italian Republic contends, without being contradicted 
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on this point by the Commission, that the circulation of a combination composed 
of a motorcycle and a trailer is a danger to road safety…Although it is possible, 
in the present case, to envisage that measures other than the prohibition laid 
down…could guarantee a certain level of road safety…such as those 
mentioned in point 170 of the Advocate General’s Opinion, the fact remains 
that Member States cannot be denied the possibility of attaining an objective 
such as road safety by the introduction of general and simple rules which will be 
easily understood and applied by drivers and easily managed and supervised by the 
competent authorities.126 
This is an exceptionally benevolent proportionality review – and in a direct action, 
where the Court had full decisive powers. It uses familiar pieces of the proof puzzle 
here but connects them to evince a ‘margin of appreciation’ doctrine rarely seen in 
proportionality analysis more generally. Linking back to the earlier discussion about 
differentiated review, an argument that the Court was kinder here because the 
measure was non-discriminatory does not fit with AG Bot’s strong condemnation of 
a ‘radical’ complete ban. Introducing the bigger picture angle, it is again difficult to 
avoid concluding that the usual standard of proof was side-lined for more 
instrumental than evidentiary reasons here, given that the judgment effected a 
significant stretching of restrictions of Article 34 TFEU. But the Court’s reluctance to 
engage with the feasibility of less restrictive measures might have left a more 
general, and dangerous, imprint; a margin of appreciation doctrine is an attractive 
framework for national judges to adopt, noting once again that national judges (in 
lower courts especially) will not lightly displace national legislative measures.127 Did 
the Court really intend to effect such a significant case law shift in reviewing 
exceptions to free movement rights?  
  It cannot simply be disregarded that the Court’s praise for the ‘general and 
simple’ nature of the rules effecting the prohibition in Trailers is at odds with its 
approach to national prohibitions in general. In an earlier case concerning Austrian 
restrictions on road transport for environmental reasons, the Court framed its 
proportionality review quite differently – and more recognisably:  
Without the need for the Court itself to give a ruling on the existence of 
alternative means, by rail or road, of transporting the goods covered by the 
contested regulation under economically acceptable conditions, or to 
determine whether other measures…could have been adopted in order to 
attain the objective of reducing emissions of pollutants in the zone concerned, 
it suffices to say in this respect that, before adopting a measure so radical as a total 
traffic ban on a section of motorway constituting a vital route of 
communication between certain Member States, the Austrian authorities 
were under a duty to examine carefully the possibility of using measures less 
restrictive of freedom of movement, and discount them only if their inadequacy, 
in relation to the objective pursued, was clearly established.128 
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The Court went on to find that the rules were a disproportionate way of protecting 
air quality, noting that ‘it has not been conclusively established in this case that the 
Austrian authorities…sufficiently studied the question whether the aim of reducing 
pollutant emissions could be achieved by other means less restrictive of the freedom 
of movement and whether there actually was a realistic alternative for the 
transportation of the affected goods by other means of transport or via other road 
routes’.129 It is hardly surprising that States remain confused about what is expected 
of them. 
 
6. Illustrating proof problems: The boundaries of economic arguments 
 
It was shown in Section 5 that there has been a discernible shift towards more 
extensive articulation of and engagement with proof issues in free movement case 
law. There is also a welcome change of tone, in that the Court has developed more 
extensive positive guidance that goes well beyond its former, more abrupt statements 
that the required standard was not reached. But this shift is not enough, on its own, 
to enable a conclusion that a properly rigorous and systematic framework is in place 
overall. In particular, multiple instances of variations in approach were provided, 
raising questions about the instrumental adaptation of the standard of proof for 
various reasons: the sensitivity of the issue under review; broader political concerns; 
or diluting the impact of legal change. Through discussion of a substantive 
justification sphere – establishing that economic rationales can legitimately justify 
free movement restrictions – we demonstrate further here why resolving these 
questions should attract more attention from the Court – and lawyers involved in 
free movement disputes – than has yet been the case. 
 It is, at one level, a standard rule of free movement law that objectives of a 
purely economic nature cannot justify a restriction of Treaty rights,130 but a more 
permissive case law thread accepts that ‘none the less…interests of an economic 
nature’131 can constitute a legitimate defence. This line of reasoning emerged in case 
law on access to medical services. In Kohll, the Court accepted that ‘the objective of 
maintaining a balanced medical and hospital service open to all…although 
intrinsically linked to the method of financing the social security system, may also fall 
within the derogations on grounds of public health…in so far as it contributes to the 
attainment of a high level of health protection’. 132  However, in Vanbraekel, the 
economic premise was extended more autonomously: ‘it cannot be excluded that the 
risk of seriously undermining the financial balance of a social security system might 
constitute an overriding reason in the general interest capable of justifying a barrier 
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to the principle of freedom to provide services’.133 In Commission v Austria, AG Jacobs 
described this as ‘a departure from the orthodox approach of the Court’ and ‘a 
double derogation, first from the fundamental principles of free movement and 
second from the accepted grounds on which those derogations can be justified’.134  
The perforation of the economic objectives exclusion remains a consistent 
feature of case law on medical services,135 raising the issue of proof. In other words, 
States have not failed in their defences because they argue economic objectives in the 
first place, but because they do not argue their claims properly.136 Moreover, the logic 
of the medical services case law has crept outwards into public spending issues more 
generally, with accompanying admonitions of the quality of State arguments – for 
example, in cases on the funding of education137 and social benefits.138 In her recent 
Opinion in Prinz and Seeberger, AG Sharpston provides an extended analysis of how 
evidence can – and should – be used to support State claims based on the extent to 
which free movement imposes a reasonable or unreasonable burden on their social 
security systems.139 The relevance of economic arguments to restrictions on the free 
movement of EU citizens occupies an especially misty normative space, accentuated 
by the fact that the circumstances in which those failing to satisfy self-sufficiency 
conditions can be deported are not clearly worked out.140 For residence rights in a 
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host State beyond an initial (essentially unregulated) stay of three months, Article 7 
of Directive 2004/38 establishes the basic threshold conditions of ‘sufficient 
resources…not to become a burden on the social assistance system of the host 
Member State’ and ‘comprehensive sickness insurance’. Recital 16 of the Preamble, 
reflecting the case law, provides more nuance: ‘[a]s long as the beneficiaries of the 
right of residence do not become an unreasonable burden on the social assistance 
system of the host Member State they should not be expelled. Therefore, an expulsion 
measure should not be the automatic consequence of recourse to the social assistance system. 
The host Member State should examine whether it is a case of temporary difficulties 
and take into account the duration of residence, the personal circumstances and the 
amount of aid granted in order to consider whether the beneficiary has become an 
unreasonable burden on its social assistance system and to proceed to his expulsion’ 
(emphasis added)141. But the inverse of this position is that recourse to the host 
State’s social assistance system can be a legitimate factor in expulsion decisions in 
some cases – embedding economically-grounded justification thinking in another 
strand of free movement law. The paradox stemming from the fact that this 
exception to the general rule concerns the rights attached to the ‘fundamental 
status’142 of EU nationals is self-evident and is widely acknowledged as one of the 
starkest disconnects between the legal reality of EU citizenship (and associated 
movement rights) and the conceptual ambitions that we might want to attach to it. 
The preliminary reference in Prinz and Seeberger brings many of these 
questions together. Mirroring Commission v Netherlands, discussed above, it concerns 
a German rule that applicants for funding to attend a higher education institution in 
another State must demonstrate three years of uninterrupted residence in Germany 
immediately before studying abroad. Having stated that the rule restricts the rights 
conferred by Articles 20 and 21 TFEU, AG Sharpston focuses primarily on whether 
the residence condition can be justified. She accepts that ‘the objective of avoiding an 
unreasonable burden which could have consequences for the overall level of 
assistance’ could justify the restriction in principle; but she also stresses that it is not 
‘sufficient for a Member State merely to assert, without more, that such an economic 
objective exists’.143 She concedes that ‘[i]t is clearly for each Member State to decide 
what part of its public budget it is willing to set aside to fund studies at home and 
abroad and to assess what overall financial burden it considers to be reasonable – 
noting that ‘[w]hilst it is not for the Court to review a Member State’s decision as to 
what is “reasonable”, it may give guidance to national courts regarding their 
examination of whether, given that decision (emphasis in original), covering the 
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maintenance (and possibly other) costs of students from other Member States will 
create a risk of an unreasonable burden’.144 The Opinion then addresses proof: 
[T]he German Government relies on data generated by the federal statistical 
office…showing that in 2008 approximately one million German nationals 
lived in other Member States, including half a million in neighbouring 
Member States. [It] submits that, if the residence requirement were to be 
eliminated, that group, together with certain non-nationals, would qualify for 
funding for the entire duration of studies outside Germany. Whilst I see no 
basis for doubting the accuracy of those figures, they obviously say nothing about 
the existence of an actual or potential risk of an unreasonable financial burden. It is 
doubtful whether all Germans residing elsewhere in the EU, from babes in 
arms to old-age pensioners, intend to pursue further studies (and in 
particular outside Germany). Nor is it evident that those who do intend to be 
students will all apply to the German authorities for funding. The German 
Government confirmed at the hearing that it did not have further, more detailed 
material to put before the Court.145 
The final sentence should sound a warning note for Germany as it awaits the Court’s 
judgment, following the tenor of and thresholds set in the access to education cases 
discussed in Section 5. AG Sharpston suggests that ‘a more robust assessment of the 
likely risk of “an unreasonable financial burden that could have consequences for the 
overall level of assistance that may be granted” is required in order to establish that a 
restriction such as the three-year rule is justified on the basis of the economic 
objective’.146 Finally, on proportionality, she notes that ‘[p]ossible alternative rules 
might be less restrictive but still effective. A different approach might incorporate 
more flexibility. I emphasise that I am not recommending any particular rule – that is 
the province of the Member State. I merely observe that it would be possible to 
construct less rigid, and therefore more proportionate, arrangements’. 147 Overall, 
however, she considered that Articles 20 and 21 TFEU preclude the contested 
residence rule. 
 There are vital substantive issues to address in the case law summarised 
above: on the implications of extending free movement rights into health-care 
services in the first place;148 on the organisation and funding of education systems;149 
and on the extension of justification arguments into the economic sphere generally.150 
Focusing here on the issue of proof, however, it is imperative to ask how the Court 
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should manage evidence-based State arguments relating to the organisation of 
national budgets – a question that takes on a heightened edge in the current climate 
of crisis. It is no longer tenable to assert that objectives of an economic nature cannot 
justify a restriction of free movement rights. Looking at the language of the case law 
– which already spans citizenship, services, and workers – it is difficult to sustain the 
argument that even aims of a purely economic nature are still proscribed. In any 
event, few public interest arguments cannot conceivably be linked to the delivery of 
some public good – and associated public expenditure. Conversely, many public 
goods are clearly structured as tradable services.151 The approach of the Court is both 
more nuanced and more complex now, and the resulting challenge is clear: how can 
bald protectionism and sound public interest choices, even economically oriented 
ones, be properly distinguished?  
The empirical capital of evidence is increasingly invoked to perform a 
decisive role in this context. But if a defendant State submits empirically-grounded 
arguments about why and how it chooses to allocate resources, on what basis should 
those decisions be assessed, let alone overturned, by any court – EU or national? 
Three points can be made in this context. First, the Court is, generally speaking, 
dealing primarily with the claims of individuals in these cases – especially in case 
law on medical services.152 Restricting the rights of one patient may indeed seem 
disproportionate in an isolated case; but how can States demonstrate – or more 
likely, project153 – to a sufficiently rigorous degree the knock-on, systemic effects for 
its health service if consequence a, b or c might materialise? How best can the 
empirical intricacies – and empirical limitations – of economic and political 
arguments be harnessed (or even appropriately explained) within the parameters of 
a litigious dispute; and how can courts then extract legal judgments from such 
evidence? Newdick rightly points out that the Court’s recognition of a ‘financial 
balance’ justification in principle might indicate that it will confine itself to a 
procedural review of national policy choices; but the case law in fact evidences that 
‘[t]he justification it has in mind does not concern the need for balance and the 
community as a whole, but the substantive interests of individual patients’.154 Some of 
the Court’s reasoning in this context could even be described as naïve. For example, 
addressing an argument that ‘the Member States would be forced to abandon the 
principles and system of their sickness insurance scheme and that both their freedom 
to set up the social security system of their choice and the operation of that system 
would be adversely affected…the achievement of the fundamental freedoms 
guaranteed by the [TFEU] inevitably requires Member States to make some 
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adjustments to their systems of social security. It does not follow that this would 
undermine their sovereign powers in this field’155 – but of course it does.  
There are signs that the Court has become more alert to the national or 
internal solidarity issues to which these types of claims relate, tempering its former 
focus on the cross-border, external understanding of resource-sharing alone. In 
Commission v Spain, a national rule governing the reimbursement of medical 
expenses, which distinguished between hospital costs incurred in Spain and during 
temporary stay in another State, was challenged. Essentially, costs relating to the 
latter would be reimbursed in Spain only in the event of life-saving treatment. AG 
Mengozzi was not convinced that the measure could be justified, dismissing the 
arguments of the defendant State – and the States that intervened – as relying ‘on the 
risk of a resurgence of “health tourism”.156 In his view, ‘it is possible to conceive of 
measures that are less restrictive than a systematic refusal of reimbursement (except 
for vital procedures) such as that which essentially derives from application of the 
Spanish legislation’.157 But the tone of the Court’s judgment was strikingly different – 
‘as the Danish and Finnish Governments have pointed out, the ever-increasing 
mobility of citizens within the European Union, particularly for reasons of tourism or 
education, is likely to mean an ever greater number of cases of unscheduled hospital 
treatment…which the Member States can in no way control’ – and it held that ‘the 
Commission has failed to show that, viewed globally, the legislation at issue 
constitutes a failure by the Kingdom of Spain to fulfil its obligations’.158  
However, second, recalling the point about resource allocation, public 
spending in one domain cannot be hermetically sealed: pressures to extend public 
service x have implications for the funding of or further investment in public services 
y and z. Must States have their entire budgets scrutinised so that a court can establish 
that less restrictive measures for one policy area may be conceived but may 
nevertheless distort the balance of the social security system overall – precisely the 
benchmark used by the Court in accepting these arguments in the first place. Even if 
such a level of scrutiny was remotely feasible in practical terms, it is neither in the 
functions nor the capacity of courts to execute it. The social security ‘brake’ added to 
Article 48 TFEU post-Lisbon leaves another cautionary imprint in this context. In 
short, resources are finite, and they are scarce; the Court of Justice has opened a 
precarious avenue of review in the suggestion that it, or any court, can work out the 
financial ‘balance’ of an entire national budget by reflecting on whether one policy 
choice could have been implemented less restrictively – a point accented by the 
impression that empirical evidence can prove such a conclusion definitively. 
Third, as AG Sharpston has acknowledged,159 neither the Member States nor 
the EU have properly grappled with the issue of uneven migration – the question at 
the heart of the Austrian and Belgian responses in the university access cases. Simply 
put, some States pay considerably more for the realisation of free movement rights 
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than others. In Bressol, AG Sharpston argued for a legislative solution. The judgment 
shows an atypical acceptance in the interim of measures States might lawfully take to 
dilute the effects of asymmetric free movement situations – but, again, so long as 
those choices are somehow ‘precisely’ empirically rationalised. This is a positive turn 
in the case law from the perspective that Member States cannot just assert things and 
do little more to establish an appropriate degree of persuasiveness than show up. 
After all, the aims against which these national choices are being evaluated are free 
movement rights i.e. core EU principles that the Member States have themselves 
dreamed up and committed to realising.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
This article has shown that, first, the framework of evidence and proof applicable in 
EU free movement law is not yet grounded in detailed procedural rules, even though 
national approaches to these issues can vary significantly. Moreover, second, proof 
factors can materially affect the outcome of a case, blurring the line between 
procedural and material considerations. This is a heady but unstable mix of 
elements, compounded by the fact that the justification of free movement restrictions 
is a dynamic constitutional question amid on-going efforts to understand how 
competence for realising the internal market can really be shared by the EU and the 
Member States. Third, the relevance of proof has clearly acquired enhanced 
significance in more recent free movement case law. At one level, the onus on 
defendant States to rationalise their public interest choices with appropriate rigour is 
an entirely welcome and consistently reinforced message. States really do have no 
one else to blame if they continue merely to ‘assert’ the value of their public interest 
objectives and/or the suitability or necessity of the national measures chosen to attain 
them. Fourth, unravelling the applicable standard of proof reveals more substantive 
but unsettled questions in free movement law: for example, whether or not the Court 
applies an implicitly variegated understanding of public interest arguments. But it is 
misleading and somewhat dangerous to attribute to the language of proof a 
character of certainty that it cannot actually deliver, especially in a system with a still 
thin culture of proof. Public interest choices are complex, as is the understandable 
quest to understand how to evidence the dividing line between rightly protecting 
things and illicit protectionism. But it is also necessary to reflect on – and distinguish 
between – the palliative and substantive benefits of the clearly intensifying focus that 
the case law places on proving that. 
We have to acknowledge that there is a difficult set of questions percolating 
under the surface of public interest arguments: not just the basic, and rightly 
accepted, contention that sympathy given to States on the basis that compliance with 
EU law costs money would be the beginning of the end for free movement rights. 
The justification/proportionality case law increasingly shifts our focus from the 
conceptual and normative problems inherent in these questions to the more neutral 
terrain of proof. But the risk is that this approach seeks to attribute qualities of 
certainty, definitiveness and objectivity to obviously complex, contestable and value-
laden concerns – against a backdrop of incremental and often opaque rules on 
evidence and proof, from the procedural point of view, in the first place. 
 
